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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALLEN TIM HEFNER, J 
Plaintiff/Respondent, J 
V. ] 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; J 
VICTORIA PALACIOS; and UTAH BOARD 
OF PARDONS, s 
i Case No. 
t Priority No. 
Defendants/Petitioners. : 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the 
general tolling provision of Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-36 (enacted 
1977), tolled the specific statute of limitations governing 
habeas corpus petitions contained in Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-31.1 
(1953 as amended) and enacted in 1979, in light of this Court's 
opinion in Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990)? 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals' opinion sought to be reviewed is 
Hefner v. Department of Corrections, No. 910338-CA (Nov. 20, 
1991) (a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A ) . 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
The decision in this case was issued on November 20, 1991. 
The State timely filed a request for a stay of remittitur which 
was granted. This Court has jurisdiction to consider this 
petition under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(a). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-1 (1953 as amended) (amended 1987). 
Civil actions may be commenced only 
within the periods prescribed in this 
chapter, after the cause of action has 
accrued, except in specific cases where a 
different limitation is prescribed by 
statute. 
2. Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-31.1 (Supp. 1979). 
Within three month: 
For relief pursuant to a writ of habeas 
corpus. This limitation shall apply not only 
as to grounds known to petitioner but also to 
grounds which in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have been known by 
petitioner or counsel for petitioner. 
3. Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-36 (Supp. 1977) (amended 1987). 
If a person entitled to bring an action, 
other than for recovery of real property, is 
at the time the cause of action accrued 
either under the age of majority or mentally 
incompetent and without a legal guardian, or 
imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in 
execution under the sentence of a criminal 
court, for a term less than for life, the 
time of the disability is not a part of the 
time limited for the commencement of the 
action. 
4. Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-301 (1953 as amended). 
A prosecution for a capital felony, 
murder in the first or second degree, 
manslaughter, embezzlement of public moneys, 
or the falsification of public records may be 
commenced at any time. 
5. Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-302 (1953 as amended). 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in 
this part, prosecution for other offenses are 
2 
subject to the following periods of 
limitations: 
(a) a prosecution for a felony or 
negligent homicide shall be commenced 
within four years after it is committed; 
(b) a prosecution for a misdemeanor other 
than negligent homicide shall be commenced 
within two years after it is committed; 
(c) a prosecution for any infraction 
shall be commenced within one year after it 
is committed. 
(2) A prosecution is commenced upon the 
finding and filing of an indictment by a 
grand jury or upon the filing of a complaint 
of information. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 16/ 1984, Allen Tim Hefner (Appellant) was found 
guilty of Arson and sentenced to serve 0-5 years in the Utah 
State Prison. See Memorandum Decision, Utah Court of Appeals 
(attached as Addendum A). Hefner paroled from the Utah State 
Prison in 1985. Id. But on June 16, 1986, he was convicted of 
Burglary, Arson and Aggravated Arson. Id. 
In August 1986, the Board of Pardons held a parole 
revocation hearing, based on Hefner's new felony convictions, and 
subsequently revoked Hefner's parole. Jd. The Board has taken 
no action against Hefner since 1986. See Memo, in Opp. to Summ. 
Rev. at 2, I 7 (attached as Addendum B). 
On April 9, 1991, four years and seven months after the last 
action of the Board of Pardons, Hefner filed a petition for writ 
of habeas corpus challenging the due process that he was afforded 
at the 1986 revocation hearing and alleging deviations from the 
sentencing guidelines. Addendum at A; Petition for Habeas Corpus 
(attached as Addendum C). Respondents moved to dismiss the 
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petition, claiming that the 3-month statute of limitations 
contained in Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-31.1 barred such an action. 
Id. 
The district court dismissed the petition based on the 
Appellees' statute of limitations defense, and the court of 
appeals summarily reversed the district court because of this 
Court's opinion in Smith v. Cook. 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990). id. 
at 1-2. Quoting Smith, the court of appeals held that "section 
78-12-31.1 does not run against a person who is at the time the 
cause of action accrued either . . . imprisoned on a criminal 
charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court." 
Id. at 2 (quotations and citations omitted). This petition for 
certiorari follows. 
ARGUMENT 
THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF SECTION 78-12-31.1 SHOULD 
CONTROL OVER THE MORE GENERAL PROVISIONS OF SECTION 
78-12-36 AND THUS SMITH SHOULD NOT GOVERN THE OUTCOME 
OF THIS CASE. 
Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990), was the only case 
used by the court of appeals to resolve the issue presented here. 
See Addendum A at 1-2. However, for the reason stated below 
Smith should not be controlling in this case. In Smith, the 
petitioner filled a petition for habeas corpus in the district 
court on June 22, 1987, claiming that his probation was 
unlawfully revoked on December 14, 1984. Smith, 803 P.2d at 789. 
The district court dismissed Smith's petition on several grounds, 
4 
one of which was that the applicable statute of limitation for 
habeas corpus barred the petitioner's claims. JEd. at 789-90. 
On appeal this Court determined that the threshold question 
was "whether Smith's two-and-one-half-year delay in challenging 
the 1984 revocation hearing bar[red] his petition for habeas 
corpus in light of Utah's three-month statute of limitations." 
Id. at 790. The Court found that the general provisions of 
section 78-12-36 (pre-April 27, 1987), containing a disability 
provision for incarcerated persons, controlled over the specific 
provisions of section 78-12-31.1. Jd. And since Smith's claims 
arose prior to the April 1987 amendments to section 78-12-36, the 
Court concluded that the habeas corpus petition was not barred by 
law. Id. 
In this case, as was in the Smith, all actions complained of 
occurred before April 27, 1987. Thus all of Hefner's causes of 
action "arose" prior to the effective date of the 1987 
amendments. Therefore, those amendments have no bearing whatso-
ever in this matter. Indeed, the only real issue is whether the 
specific habeas corpus provisions of the 1979 amendments to 
chapter 12 of Title 78 control over the general tolling 
provisions of that chapter. If so, Hefner's action was barred by 
the three-month statute of limitation contained in section 78-12-
31.1, as found by the district court. 
This Court made its ruling in Smith upon the premise that 
any ambiguity in a criminal statute should be "resolved in favor 
of [the] criminal defendant." See Smith, 803 P.2d at 791. Such 
5 
a premise is highly questionable in light of the fact that Smith 
was merely a petitioner in a "civil" proceeding and not a 
defendant in a criminal action. See id., n.10 (cases cited by 
the Court relate only to criminal proceedings not civil cases); 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 65B (habeas corpus is a civil action)and should 
not be followed in sxibsequent cases. Accordingly, neither Smith 
nor Hefner should be entitled to benefit from an ambiguity in a 
civil statute dealing with time limitations for bringing civil 
actions. See U.C.A. SS 78-12-1 et seq. (1953 as amended) 
(limitations of actions for civil cases). The Court in Smith 
mistakenly addressed the ambiguity in 78-12-36 as though it were 
a criminal statute even though it is clearly civil in nature. 
See Smith. 803 P.2d at 791; U.C.A. SS 76-1-301 et seq. (limita-
tions of actions for criminal cases). 
Because this is merely a civil action, no deference should 
be given to either party when interpreting the meaning of the 
controlling law. Instead, in the interest of fairness and 
justice, the exact meaning of any ambiguous statute should be 
determined in accordance with correct principles of statutory 
construction. The Court should resolve any conflicts between 
section 78-12-36 and section 18-12-31.1 in favor of the three-
month statute of limitations contained in section 78-12-31.1. 
First, the law is clear that when irreconcilable conflicts 
exist between the general provision of one statute and the 
specific provision of another, the specific provisions control 
and should be given precedent over the general provisions. See 
6 
generally Busic v. United States. 446 U.S. 398 (1980); Chelsea 
Plaza Homes. Inc. v. Moore, 601 P.2d 1100 (Kan. 1979); Uniform 
Statutory Construction Act S 17; 73 Am. Jur. 2d# Statutes S 257; 
Earl T. Crawford, The Construction of Statutes S 167 (1940). In 
this instance, the provisions of section 78-12-36 are very 
general in nature dealing with all types of civil actions, not 
just habeas corpus proceedings; whereas, the provisions of 78-12-
31.1 are very specific in nature and deal only with habeas corpus 
proceedings. Therefore section 78-12-31.1 should be controlling. 
Second, when two acts irreconcilably conflict, the latest 
legislative expression prevails and the prior act yields to the 
full extent of the conflict. See e.g., United States v. 
Yuoinovich, 256 U.S. 450 (1921); Thiokol Chemical Corp. v. 
Peterson, 393 P.2d 391 (Utah 1964); Uniform Statutory 
Construction Act S 18; 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes S 255, 256; 2A C. 
Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction S 23.09 (4th ed. 1985); 
Francis J. McCaffrey, Statutory Construction S 9 (1953). Section 
78-12-31.1 was enacted by the Legislature in 1979, two years 
after the enactment of the general provisions of section 78-12-
36. Section 78-12-31.1 was specifically intended to limit the 
amount of time that incarcerated persons had to file habeas 
corpus actions. See U.C.A. § 78-12-31.1 (Supp. 1979); 1977 Laws 
of Utah ch. 133, SS 1 & 2 (preamble states that the act relates 
to post-conviction remedies and provides limitations to habeas 
actions). Furthermore, section 78-12-31.1 did not exist when 
section 78-12-36 was enacted; thus its provisions could not and 
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were not intended to govern the specific provisions of section 
78-12-31.1. Accordingly, section 78-12-31.1 must be construed to 
govern section 78-12-36. Any other interpretation of these two 
statutes would nullify the very propose for which the statute of 
limitation provision of section 78-12-31.1 was enacted. 
Finally, under the "golden rule" of statutory construction, 
courts are to interpret conflicting statutes in a manner which 
gives both statutes rational meaning. See 2A C.Sands, Sutherland 
Statutory Construction S 45.12, at 54 (4th ed. 1985); Francis J. 
McCaffrey, Statutory Construction § 9 (1953). Courts should not 
interpret two statutes in a manner that makes one or the other 
statute meaningless or creates absurd results. See generally 
Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction S 45.12; Kuzma v. 
I.R.S.. 821 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1987); Snvder v. Clune, 390 P.2d 
915 (Utah 1964). "[Construction that converts a statute into an 
absurdity is a forbidden construction unless no other is 
possible." Bachicha v. Municipal Court of City of Thornton, 581 
P.2d 746 (Colo. 1978) (emphasis added). This is so because it is 
presumed that legislatures do not "deliberately engage in 
unnecessary or meaningless acts." State v. Cunningham, 598 P.2d 
756 (Wash. App. 1980). Instead, courts should apply a common 
sense approach to interpreting statutes. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v* 
Barton, 474 A.2d 104 (1984). 
Applying Smith in this case would have just the opposite 
effects. By using the Smith analysis, incarcerated persons can 
file petitions for habeas corpus relief indefinitely, so long as 
8 
their cause of actions arose prior to April 1987 and they remain 
incarcerated. This is true despite the fact that section 78-12-
31.1 was enacted two years after the tolling statute of section 
78-12-36 which specifically limits the time to file a habeas 
petition to three months. Likewise, persons with claims falling 
into the above category and serving any sentence less than "life" 
may wait until their eventual release "plus three months" before 
filing a petition challenging the constitutionality of their 
confinement. See Smith. 803 P.2d at 789-91.l 
Common sense dictates that one who is confined unconstitu-
tionally should bring a habeas corpus petition prior to release. 
Indeed, the traditional function of habeas corpus is to assure 
that a person is not "unjustly imprisoned or otherwise restrained 
of his liberty." See Spain v. Steward, 639 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah 
1981). A petitioner substantially moots any relief that a court 
can grant in a habeas action by waiting for actual release before 
filing a claim.2 See id. at 168. Furthermore, habeas corpus is 
1
 This actually encourages prisoners to intentionally wait 
before filing habeas corpus petitions since the longer a prisoner 
waits the greater the chance of being released. Elapsed time 
leads to unavailable witnesses, misplaced or lost evidence and 
faded memories, which in turn, assists claims of ineffective 
counsel, judicial or Board of Pardons misconduct, insufficient 
evidence, and lack of procedural due process. 
2
 The "limited number of situations" in which incarceration 
is not the basis for a habeas action is minuscule when compared 
with the number of petitions filed challenging the legality of 
incarceration. Compare Smith, 803 P.2d at 791, n.9. Further-
more, those limited cases would not generally, if ever, involve 
persons that have been incarcerated prior to the running of the 
three-month limitation. Thus, the Court's analysis on the 
tolling statute's applicability to section 78-12-31.1 leads to 
irrational results. 
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intended to be a speedy remedy, not an action that lurks 
indefinitely and controlled only by a prisoner's own agenda. The 
Smith opinion fails to consider the preceding arguments and 
therefore should be reconsidered in lieu of this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
By giving preference to the general disability provision of 
section 78-12-36, this Court has virtually eliminated any meaning 
or application that section 78-12-31.1 has during the ten years 
immediately following the statute's enactment (or those years 
prior to April 1987). Certainly the legislature could not, nor 
did it, intend such a meaningless result when it enacted this 
section of the civil limitations provisions. Thus, the holding 
in Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990) should be over-turned, 
and the three-month statute of limitations contained in Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-12-31.1 reinstated as enacted by the legislature. 
WHEREFORE, Appellees ask that the Court grant certiorari in 
this instance, pursuant to Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, because of the importance that section 78-12-31.1 has 
in habeas corpus actions. Smith sets bad precedent in civil 
cases and allows inmates, who are or have been incarcerated at 
the Utah State Prison, to indefinitely file habeas corpus peti-
tions without any limitation period what-so-ever. 
day of December, 1991. 
PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorray General 
( .LORENZO Kf MILLER 
> — * ^ Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the <J day of December 1991, I caused to 
be mailed four exact copies of the forgoing Petition for 
Certiorari to: 
Allen Tim Hefner 
P.O. Box 550 
Gunnison, Utah 84634 
frenzo/K. Miller 
"Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
F
'tED 
NOV $01991 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Allen Tim Hefner, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
Department of Corrections; 
Victoria Palacios; and Board 
of Pardons, 
Respondents and Appellees. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 910338-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 20, 1991) 
Sixth District, Sanpete County 
The Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
Attorneys: Allen Tim Hefner, Gunnison, Appellant Pro Se 
R. Paul Van Dam and Lorenzo K. Miller, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Russon, Bench, and Greenwood (Law & Motion). 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court on its own motion for 
summary reversal based on manifest error. We reverse and remand 
for further proceedings. 
In 1984, appellant was convicted of arson and sentenced to 
serve 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison. In 1985, appellant was 
placed on parole. On June 16, 1986, appellant was convicted of 
burglary, arson and aggravated arson. In August 1986, the Board 
of Pardons held a parole hearing and subsequently revoked 
appellant's parole on September 8, 1986. 
On April 9, 1991, appellant filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus, claiming he was not afforded due process at the 
revocation hearing and alleging deviations from the sentencing 
guidelines. Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, claiming 
the petition was barred by the three-month statute of limitation 
contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1987). The court 
dismissed the petition, and this appeal followed. 
The dispositive issue is whether the trial court erred in 
ruling that the statute of limitation barred the petition. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1987) provides that that a writ of habeas 
corpus must be brought within three months. However, in Smith v. 
Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 790 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the statute of limitation contained in section 78-12-31.1 
does not run against a person who "is at the time the cause of 
action accrued either . . . imprisoned on a criminal charge, or 
in execution under the sentence of a criminal court.11 
In this case, shortly after appellant's cause of action 
accrued, appellant was imprisoned on a criminal charge. 
Therefore, the statute of limitation did not run during his 
period of imprisonment. In addition, the State now concedes that 
the trial court erred in granting its motion to dismiss based on 
the three-month statute of limitation. We therefore conclude 
that the trial court erred in ruling that appellant's petition 
was barred by the statute of limitation. 
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
"Pamela T. Greenwood' Judge 
910338-CA 
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ADDENDUM B 
PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Utah Attorney General 
LORENZO K. MILLER (5761) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
6100 South 300 East Suite 204 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 265-5638 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ALLEN TIM HEFNER, ! 
Petitioner/Appellant, i 
V . i 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, i 
et al., : 
Respondents/Appellees. ; 
'. MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
: TO SUMMARY REVERSAL AND 
: IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY 
: DISPOSITION PURSUANT TO 
! RULE 10(A)(2). 
: Case No. 910338-CA 
Respondents, by and through their counsel, Lorenzo K. Miller, 
Assistant Attorney General, hereby submit this memorandum in 
opposition to summary reversal of the district court's final 
judgment and in support of their motion for summary disposition of 
this appeal. 
MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On February 16, 1984, Allen Tim Hefner (Petitioner) was 
found guilty by the Second Judicial District Court of Arson and was 
sentenced to serve 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison. Resp's 
Memo, in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss, Ex. No. 1 (for the Court's 
5 * 
SEP 1Z 1991 
Clerk „ . -j 
convenience, this memorandum and its accompanying exhibits have 
been attached). 
2. Hefner paroled from the Utah State Prison in 1985. Id. , 
Ex. No. 2, 4 & 5. 
3. On June 16, 1986, Hefner was convicted by jury of 
Burglary, Arson and Aggravated Arson. Id., Ex. Nos. 6-8. 
4. On August 20, 1986, the Board of Pardons convened a parole 
revocation hearing based on Hefner's new felony convictions. Id., 
Ex. No. 13. Hefner was given adequate notice of the hearing date, 
place and time. JEd., Ex. No. 9. He was also informed of the 
charges against him and his rights before the Board. JEd., Ex. Nos. 
9, 10, 11 & 12. 
5. At the hearing, Hefner was represented by counsel and was 
given the opportunity to speak in his own behalf. Id., Ex. No. 13. 
6. The Board of Pardons made written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and revoked Hefner's parole of October 8, 1985. 
Id. , Ex. Nos. 14 & 15. The Board then set June 1992 as a tentative 
rehearing date. Ex. No. 14 & 15. 
7. The Board of Pardons has taken no action against Hefner 
since his 1986 parole revocation hearings. JEd. at 3, I 13. 
8. On April 9, 1991, four years and seven months after the 
last action of the Board of Pardons, Hefner filed a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 3, f 15. 
2 
9- Hefner challenged the due process he was afforded at the 
19 86 revocation hearing and alleged deviations from the sentencing 
guidelines. Petition, H5 5-10. Hoverer, Hefner provided the 
district court with no evidence of either claim. Petition; Resp's 
Memo, in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss at 3, I 16.l 
10. Respondents moved for dismissal of the petition base on 
the 3-month statute of limitations of U.C.A. § 78-12-31.1. Motion 
to Dismiss; Resp's Memo, in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss at 3, I 16; 
Petition at 1, 5 1 (petition gives last date of Board's actions). 
11. Hefner failed respond to the Respondents' motion to 
dismiss, and Judge Don V. Tibbs of the Sixth Judicial District 
Court dismissed the petition based on the statute of limitations. 
12. No other issues were addressed by the court because the 
time for filing the action had elapsed. Petitioner then appealed 
the court's decision. 
ARGUMENT 
1. SUMMARY REVERSAL OF A DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION IS 
INAPPROPRIATE UNLESS "MANIFEST ERROR- IS APPARENT. 
According to Rule 10(e) of the Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure, the Court of Appeals should only summarily reverse a 
x
.Throughout the proceeding before the Third District Court, 
Petitioner never contested the facts as stated by Respondents in 
their Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss the Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
3 
district court's decision in cases of "manifest error." For the 
reasons stated below, no manifest error exists in this appeal. The 
record of this case reflects only that the district court was 
correct in dismissing Hefner's petition. Therefore, this Court 
should not summarily reversed the district court's decision but 
should summarily affirm it because no "substantial question is 
presented." See Rule 10(e). 
2. FOOTE IS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS APPEAL BECAUSE THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATION WAS NOT AT ISSUE IN THAT CASE. 
The only issue presented in this present appeal is whether 
Judge Tibbs properly applied the 3-month statute of limitations 
contained in U.C.A. § 78-12-31.1 (1953 as amended). No other 
issues have been offered by Hefner nor raised on appeal. See 
Appeal of Decision; Docketing Statement, filed July 29, 1991. 
After receiving the Court's order to address this case in 
light of Foote v. Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991), 
Counsel for Respondents has thoroughly examined both cases and is 
convinced that the Foote decision has no bearing on the issue 
presented here. In his capacity as an assistant attorney general 
for the State of Utah, Counsel currently represents both the State 
of Utah and the Board of Pardons in Foote v. Board of Pardons, Case 
No. 910903311 HC (3rd Dist. Ct.) and the present case. In this 
capacity, Counsel has become very familiar with the entire proceed-
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ings of the Foote case before the Utah Supreme Court and district 
court. Counsel also represented the same parties throughout all 
proceedings of the present case before the district Court.2 
A. Foote v. Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991). 
In Foote, the petitioner filed an original petition for habeas 
corpus relief with the Utah Supreme Court claiming that the Board 
of Pardons denied him due process because it was biased against him 
and had denied him access to the Board's files. See Foote 
Petition, Ex. No. 8 at 2 & 11-19 (attached). Subsequently, Foote's 
petition was heard by the Utah Supreme Court which remanded the 
case to the district court for further consideration of Mr. Foote's 
due process claims. See Foote, 808 P.2d at 734-35. 
At no time during the proceedings before the Utah Supreme 
Court did the Board of Pardons or the State of Utah raise the 
statute of limitations defense of U.C.A. § 78-12-31.1. Nor was the 
statute of limitations defense address by the justices in their 
final opinion. See Foote, 808 P. 2d at 734-35. Finally, no 
evidence was presented by either party to sufficiently substantiate 
or directly refute the petitioner's factual claims that the Board 
was biased against him. 
2
.Counsel has filed all motions and memoranda on behalf of 
Respondents in this matter before the Third and Sixth Judicial 
District Courts. 
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B. The Present Case. 
In this case, Hefner filed a an original petition with the 
district court. Judge Tibbs, after having been informed of the 
State's statute of limitation defense and not having received any 
response from Hefner, dismissed the petition based on U.C.A. § 78-
12-31.1. Judge Tibbs stated in his final order that the petition 
was being dismissed because the last act by the Respondents (Board 
of Pardons) was on September 8, 1986, four years prior to the 
filing of this action. Judge Tibbs specifically concluded that 
Hefner's cause of action was barred by law. See Order Dismissing 
Petition, dated May 21, 1991. 
The record in this case shows that the merits of Hefner's 
petition were reached by the court, nor were the merits of Hefner's 
claims actually argued by Respondents prior to dismissal. Id..; see 
also Motion to Dismiss; Memo, in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss. 
Therefore, any applicability that Foote might have had to the 
merits of Hefner's claims do not apply to this appeal since the 
statute of limitations bars the determination of such issues by the 
lower court. Accordingly, summary reversal of the district court's 
decision is inappropriate. 
2. THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL WAS PROPER BECAUSE 
PETITIONER'S PETITION IS UNTIMELY AND BARRED 
BY THE THREE-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
As noted, Hefner did not bring the petition for writ of habeas 
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corpus until four years after the last act by the Board of Pardons. 
The Utah Code Annotated, explicitly states that the statute of 
limitations for habeas corpus relief is three months. 78-12-31.1. 
Section 78-12-31.1 further states this limitation applies "not only 
as to grounds known to petitioner but also to grounds which in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have been known by 
petitioner or counsel for petitioner." 
Petitioner was present at the last Board of Pardons hearing 
that affected his parole status, and he was informed of the Board's 
decision on September 3, 1986. Thus, the statute of limitations 
began to run on that date, and the time to file a petition expired 
on December 3, 1989. U.C.A. § 78-12-31.1; see Becton Dickinson and 
Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983) (the general rule is that 
a cause of action accrues on the happening of the last event 
necessary to complete the cause of action). 
The last event necessary to complete Hefner's cause of action 
would have, if at all, taken place on or about September 3, 1986, 
four years and seven months prior to Hefner's filing of the 
petition. See Memo, in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss at 3, H 15; 
Petition at 1, I 1. Contrary to what Hefner may be asserting, the 
Foote decision has no bearing upon the last act taken by the Board 
of Pardons, nor does the decision create a new cause of action as 
Hefner advocates to the Court. 
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In Hatch v. DeLand, this Court held that inmates can petition 
for judicial review of the Board of Pardons actions if such actions 
violate substantial constitutional rights. 790 P. 2d 49 (Utah App. 
1990). Accordingly, Hefner could have and should have known that 
he could challenge the Board's alleged constitutional violations as 
early as March of 1990 when Hatch was decided. 
Furthermore, Hefner had the same judicial routes available to 
him, as both Mr. Hatch and Mr. Foote, to change the state of the 
law as it existed in 1986. But instead of acting on his belief 
that his constitutional rights may have been violated, Hefner sat 
back and waited for the law to become more favorable to his own 
position. Thus, Hefner voluntarily waived his right to petition 
the courts for relief. The Utah Supreme Court addressed this same 
issue in Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1983). 
In Lord, the appellant attempted to sue her husband after a 
judicial decision overruled the doctrine of interspousal tort 
immunity. In dismissing her suit as time barred, the Court held 
that where the wife at all times had access to the courts to seek 
lifting of the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity, the statute 
of limitations was not tolled during the time prior to the 
abolition of the doctrine. The court stated that "the wife was not 
entitled to wait for others to seek such changes in the law." Id. 
at 1290. See also Andrews v. Schulsen, 773 P.2d 832, 833 (Utah 
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1988) (changes in law do not constitute "good cause" for filing 
successive petitions for writ of habeas corpus). 
The basis for decisions such as Shaw is obvious: the rules of 
finality and judicial economy require that claimants not be allowed 
to wait indefinitely for more favorable judicial interpretation of 
the law before filing claims. If every claimant were allowed to 
toll the applicable limitations periods while awaiting judicial 
abolition of controlling precedent, parties to the potential 
lawsuit would never be able to assess potential liability. Every 
time that a high-court reversed, in whole or in part, a prior 
decision, a new round of litigation would pursue on claims that are 
literally decades old.3 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, the court should not summarily reverse 
the final order of the Sixth Judicial District Court. Hefner's 
petition was untimely brought and barred by the 3-month statute of 
limitations contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1. Because 
Foote v. Board of Pardons. 808 P. 2d 735 (Utah 1991) did not address 
3
. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), creates a prime example 
of the need for judicial finality and statutes of limitations. Can 
the Court imagine the types of claims that can be brought under the 
tolling argument proposed by Hefner if Roe is eventually overturned 
by the United States Supreme Court? Claims could be made on events 
taking place in 1974 because the privacy of the mother prevented 
such claims until Roe's reversal by the Court. 
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the only issue presented in this appeal, it should not affect the 
outcome of this case. However, as shown in this memorandum, it 
plainly appears that the issue that is presented in this appeal 
does not present a substantial question for this court to decide. 
WHEREFORE, Respondents oppose summary reversal of the district 
court's decision in this case and request that the Court summarily 
affirm Judge Tibbs' final order dismissing Hefner's petition for 
writ of habeas corpus as being untimely. 
In the alternative, if this Court believes that Foote somehow 
applies to the instant appeal and has not been properly addressed 
in this memorandum, Respondents move this court for a more definite 
statement as the issues this Court would have Respondents address. 
And in case of that event, Respondents would need an additional 30 
days from the date of the Court's decision to fully brief the 
issues presented by the Court. 
Dated this !J day of September, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney ^ General .
 f *— ^ 
Lorenzo K. Miller 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the / ~; day of September 1991, I caused to 
be mailed an exact copy of RESPONDENTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
SUMMARY REVERSAL AND IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY DISPOSITION PURSUANT TO 
RULE 10(A)(2) to: 
Allen Tim Hefner 
P.O. Box 550 
Gunnison, Utah 84634 
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service. 
Lorenzo K. Miller 
Assistant/Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM C 
f Judicial District 
Lien Tim Hefner 
;torney Pro Se ^ O APR 0 # ^ 9 1 
•0. Box 550 
mnison, Utah 84634 
nr 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUitT OF SALT LAKH, COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo—-
len Tim Hefner: 
P e t i t i o n e r : 
V S . 
ah Departmenx of 
rrections, State of Utah, 
ctoria Palacios, Utah 
ard of Pardons ET. AL. 
* 
PETITION 
FOR V/RIT OE HABEAS CORPUS 
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
Case No. 
jmBJDGE JAMES S. SAWAVA 
Respondant: * 
oooOooo 
^ 4X9? 
Comes now the P e t i t i o n e r , Allen Tim rlefnei, and for good 
ise of ac t ion a l l eges as fol lows: 
(1) In Ju ly of 1986 Pe t i t i one r recieved a Six (6) year 
Learing from the Utah Board of Pardons. 
(2) Guide l i n e s and recomendations of the Utan Adualt 
bat ion and parole ooth ca l led for Fif ty-one (51) months 
i nca rce ra t ion . 
(5) Board used l e t t e r irom victom, indicat ing Financial 
n, and previous criminal ac t s as reason for exceeding 
omended gu ide l ines . 
(4) Pe t i t i one r was not informed of t n i s ac t ion at tne 
e of the hear ing . 
(5) P e t i t i o n e r s Civ i l Rights to Due Process were v io la ted 
to confront and cross examin wi t t eness , and present evidence 
wn defence. 
(6) Had Pe t i t i one r been aware of and able to respond, 
evidence could have been produced to the fact tha t Pe t i t ione r 
was inves t iga ted of al leged previous crime and found to have 
been over Two-hundred (2Q0) miles away at the time of occurence. 
(7) That victom did not attempt to implicate Pe t i t ioner 
u n t i l a f t e r , a t the ins i s t ence of P e t i t i o n e r ' s insurance company 
victom took and f a i l ed Two (2) Polygraph t e s t s 
(8) Evidence tha t victom's l o s t property was under seizure 
by the In t e rna l Revenue Service a t the time of loss could have 
been presented, re fu te ing victoms s ta ted Finaneia l Ruin* 
(9) Evidence could have been presented tha t "Victom" did 
in fac t gain Pinancialy from the loss of property i e . Credit 
against unpaid With-holding Tax tha t was the cause of the 
In t e rna l Revenue Service Seizure* _ __-—«" — ,^, 
(10) ^S1^^:jPetit1x>nerifiU ci&ae was used t o - e s t a b l i s h 
el l i ies w ^ c m l d tliereCore:jaot,lalso be used t«P enhance 
Cr ^zceed t f fesaoe guidelines
 # -
WHEREFORE: Pe t i t i one r prays tha t t h i s cour t : 
(1) Schedule a hearing at which time Pe t i t i one r may be 
represented . 
(2) Permit P e t i t i o n e r , Who remains indigent , to proceed 
without pre-payment of cos t , Pees or other assessment. 
(3) Grant Pe t i t i one r the Authority to obtain subpoenas 
in Forma Pauperis , for witnesses and Documents necessary to 
a s s i s t in the proof of f a c t s al leged in the P e t i t i o n as 
s ta ted above. 
(4) Issue a ORDER for the Post Conviction Relief to have 
the Pe t i t i one r brought before i t , to the end tha t He may be 
Discharged from the I l l e g a l and Unconst i tut ional Confinement 
and R e s t r a i n t , or any other r e l i e f tha t the court may deem 
as j u s t . 
Dated t h i s 3# Day of rftroh t19 f/ , 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
I he reby c e r t i f y t h a t I have mailed Pos tage p r e - p a i d a 
t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of t h e fo rego ing Motions, I nc lud ing 
Motion fo r appointment of Counsel , Motion fo r P roduc t ion of 
Documents, and a V/rix of Habeas Corpus, a long wi th a l l 
A f f i d a v i t s i n suppor t of t h e Motion t o t n e f o l l o w i n g : 
Utaxi S t a t e At torney Generals o f f i c e 
236 S t a t e C a p i t a l Bui ld ing 
S a l t ijake Cixy, Utah 84114 
ClerK 01 t n e Ta i rd D i s t r i c t Court 
240 iiast 400 South 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 64111 
Dated t n i s ;? Day of Apt / *19j? 
Al i en Tim ta 
Attorney Pro Se 
